OpenFiat Tokenomics Specification (OTS)

Status Banner#

This document is a DRAFT. Every numeric parameter below is either a value the protocol steward has explicitly confirmed, or a proposed default awaiting sign-off. Each parameter is tagged:

• [CONFIRMED] — explicitly decided; implementations may treat this as final.
• [PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF] — a reasonable default chosen so implementation work isn't blocked, but not yet a final decision. Anything tagged this way MUST be implemented as a governance-updatable parameter, never as a hardcoded constant, so a later sign-off change doesn't require a code rewrite.

Chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, and 23 of the whitepaper repeatedly defer exact figures to "the Tokenomics Specification." This is that document. It does not repeat the behavioral/state-machine design already specified in those chapters or in OFS-1600/2300/2400/4000 — it supplies the numbers those documents deliberately omitted.

1. Supply and Denomination#

Parameter	Value	Status
Token name	OPEN	[CONFIRMED]
Total / max supply	1,000,000,000 OPEN	[CONFIRMED]
Decimals	9	[CONFIRMED]
Post-genesis minting	None. Mint authority is permanently revoked at genesis (see OFS-4200 §3).	[CONFIRMED]

Note on Ch.13 vs. Ch.23: Chapter 13 states supply is fixed absolutely; Chapter 23 allows a governance-authorized minting exception. This specification resolves the inconsistency: supply is strictly fixed for v1 (mint authority is revoked, not merely restricted). Any future mint event would require a new token (or a wrapped/bridged mechanism) rather than a code path that exists in v1 — this is a deliberate simplification to remove an entire class of governance-can-inflate-supply risk from the initial system.

2. Genesis Allocation#

Seven buckets, named in Chapter 14, with no percentages given there. Proposed split:

Bucket	% of supply	OPEN	Status
Community Presale	20%	200,000,000	[CONFIRMED]
Ecosystem Treasury	17%	170,000,000	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Community Incentives	17%	170,000,000	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
AllenHark Treasury	14%	140,000,000	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Infrastructure / Node Bootstrap Program	12%	120,000,000	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Liquidity Programs	12%	120,000,000	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Strategic Reserve	8%	80,000,000	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Total	100%	1,000,000,000

Why the Presale bucket is the entire 20% (200,000,000 OPEN), confirmed by the protocol steward: this is no longer a raise-ceiling sizing choice, because the presale itself has no fixed hard cap on demand (§3). The presale sells from this bucket at 1 OPEN = 1 USDC toward a $2,000,000 target — a goal, not a cap — and keeps selling into the same 200,000,000-token bucket for as long as demand continues. Whatever remains unsold when the presale closes is offered afterward in a Public Sale at 1 OPEN = 1.25 USDC (§3). Because the bucket funds two sequential sale phases rather than one capped raise, its size is decoupled from the $2,000,000 target. The other six buckets absorb the resulting reduction proportionally to their prior share (each individually rounded to the nearest whole percent via largest-remainder so the split still sums to exactly 100%).

Vesting (Chapter 14 gives philosophy only, no durations):

Bucket	Cliff	Vesting after cliff	Status
Community Presale	0 (immediate unlock)	—	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF; see §3 tradeoff note]
AllenHark Treasury	12 months	36 months linear	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Ecosystem Treasury	12 months	36 months linear	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Infrastructure / Node Bootstrap	0	Emitted programmatically per node-reward rules (OFS-1600), not a simple linear release	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Community Incentives	0	Emitted programmatically as incentives are earned	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Liquidity Programs	3 months	24 months linear	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Strategic Reserve	12 months	48 months linear	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]

3. Presale Terms#

Parameter	Value	Status
Price	1 OPEN = 1 USDC	[CONFIRMED]
Accepted contribution assets	Native SOL, and any stablecoin on the whitelist below	[CONFIRMED]
Conversion mechanism	Atomic on-chain swap via Jupiter's aggregator program (CPI), executed inside the same transaction as the contribution	[CONFIRMED]
Raise target	2,000,000 USDC-equivalent — a goal, not a cap. The presale keeps selling out of the full 200,000,000 OPEN Community Presale bucket (§2) if demand continues past this target.	[CONFIRMED]
Hard cap	None distinct from the bucket itself — the presale may sell up to the full 200,000,000 OPEN Community Presale allocation.	[CONFIRMED]
Soft cap	5,000,000 USDC-equivalent; contributions are refundable if unmet by end time	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Minimum contribution per wallet	50 USDC-equivalent	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Maximum contribution per wallet	1,000,000 USDC-equivalent	[CONFIRMED]
Vesting on presale tokens	None — immediate unlock at claim	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Max swap slippage tolerance	1%	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Stablecoin whitelist	USDC, USDT, PYUSD (devnet equivalents/test mints during the devnet phase of this build)	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF, and structurally must remain a governance-updatable list, never an open "any SPL token claiming to be a stablecoin"]

Immediate-unlock tradeoff, stated explicitly: no vesting on presale tokens is simpler to ship and consistent with "the presale unlocks development funding" urgency, but it means presale buyers can sell into the open market the instant tokens are claimable, with no lockup smoothing out sell pressure. A short cliff + linear vest would reduce that risk at the cost of slower time-to-market for the presale itself. This specification proposes immediate unlock and flags the tradeoff rather than silently picking a side.

Refund semantics: if the soft cap is unmet, refunds are paid in USDC (the post-swap asset), not in whatever the contributor originally sent (SOL or another stablecoin). The presale UI must state this plainly before a contributor confirms a non-USDC contribution.

Public Sale (follow-on phase):

Parameter	Value	Status
Trigger	Presale closes (end time reached) with unsold OPEN remaining in the Community Presale bucket	[CONFIRMED]
Price	1 OPEN = 1.25 USDC	[CONFIRMED]
Offered amount	Whatever remains of the 200,000,000 OPEN Community Presale bucket after the presale closes	[CONFIRMED]
Accepted contribution assets, conversion mechanism	Same as the presale (§3, above)	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF, pending confirmation the same program/mechanism is reused rather than a separate deployment]

The Public Sale is not a separate token bucket — it is the second, higher-priced phase for selling whatever the presale itself did not sell. A contributor cannot buy at the presale's 1 OPEN = 1 USDC rate once the presale phase has closed.

4. Staking#

Seven staked roles per Chapter 15/23: Merchant, Arbitrator, Node Operator, Notification Provider, Oracle Provider, Risk Intelligence Provider, Snapshot Provider.

Parameter	Value	Status
Minimum stake (all roles, flat for v1)	1,000 OPEN	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Arbitrator minimum stake (higher bar, per Ch.11 §11.6)	10,000 OPEN	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Unbonding / unlock period (all roles, flat for v1)	7 days	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Effective-stake timing on unstake request	Reduces immediately at request time, not only at unlock release	[DECISION — whitepaper wording is ambiguous between these two readings; this specification picks the immediate-reduction interpretation to prevent a participant from requesting unstake and still counting the stake toward eligibility/voting/priority during the unbonding window]
Slashing percentage (flat, all misconduct types, v1)	10% of staked amount	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Arbitrator minimum protocol age before eligibility	30 days since first stake	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Arbitrator "no active penalties" definition	No unresolved slash event in the trailing 90 days	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]

Enumerated slashing triggers (Chapter 15 gives categories, not concrete triggers — this is the concrete list a program can actually check):

1. Arbitrator misses a case decision deadline (deadline itself set by OFS-2400's dispute-lifecycle timing, currently undefined — flag as a dependency on a future OFS-2400 amendment).
2. Oracle-submitted price deviates from the Jupiter-referenced market price (OFS-4200 §5) by more than 5% at time of submission. [PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF on the 5% figure]
3. Node operator's uptime/availability falls below a to-be-defined SWQoS threshold for a sustained period (OFS-1600 defines the priority formula but not a slashing threshold — flag as a dependency on a future OFS-1600 amendment).
4. Proven double-settlement attempt (an instruction sequence attempting to release the same escrow twice) — this is caught by the escrow program's own state machine (OFS-2300, OFS-4200 §6) and should never actually succeed on-chain, but a proven attempt (detected off-chain via transaction-log analysis) is still slashable as a deterrent.

Triggers 1 and 3 depend on future amendments to OFS-2400 and OFS-1600 respectively to define concrete deadlines/thresholds; until those exist, only triggers 2 and 4 are enforceable in v1.

5. Governance#

Parameter	Value	Status
Proposal identifier	OFIP-#### (e.g. OFIP-0001)	[DECISION — whitepaper's "OFIP" chosen over OFS-4000's "OFP"; more descriptive, whitepaper-facing naming wins]
Proposal categories	Informational, Standards, Parameter, Treasury, Protocol-Upgrade, Constitutional (whitepaper's 6-category taxonomy)	[DECISION — chosen over OFS-4000's 5-category Protocol/Economics/Marketplace/Infrastructure/Governance taxonomy]
Proposal stake deposit	5,000 OPEN	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Deposit refund condition	Refunded if quorum is met by the voting deadline; forfeited to the Ecosystem Treasury otherwise	[DECISION — approximates the whitepaper's more subjective "frivolous/abandoned" language with a programmatically-checkable quorum-met proxy]
Vote-lock duration	7 days (matches the voting period)	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Vote-weight snapshot timing	At the moment each vote is cast, not at proposal creation	[DECISION — either is defensible; cast-time chosen for v1 simplicity]
Quorum	10% of circulating staked-for-governance supply	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Approval threshold — Informational, Standards, Parameter	Simple majority (>50%)	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Approval threshold — Treasury	60% supermajority	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Approval threshold — Protocol-Upgrade, Constitutional	66% supermajority + 20% quorum (higher than the standard 10%)	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]

6. Treasury / Revenue Router#

Fee amounts are deliberately not fixed here — Chapter 23 explicitly wants fees adjustable as OPEN's price moves, and this specification respects that: every fee is a governance-updatable parameter, never a constant.

Parameter	Value	Status
Treasury sub-accounts	Development, Ecosystem, Infrastructure, Emergency Reserve	[CONFIRMED — named in Ch.14/16]
Dust-remainder-on-fee-split rule	Any remainder from integer-division fee splits goes to the Development sub-account	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Default ad-listing fee	1 OPEN	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]
Default dispute-filing fee	20 OPEN	[PROPOSED — NEEDS SIGN-OFF]

7. Explicitly Out of Scope for v1#

The following are real parts of the whitepaper's long-term vision but are not built in the phase of work this specification supports:

• Chapter 23's governance-authorized post-genesis minting exception (§1 — supply is strictly fixed for v1).
• Partial Settlement as a dispute resolution outcome (OFS-2400 marks this "Future").
• Per-role-differentiated staking minimums (v1 ships flat + one arbitrator-specific minimum; further differentiation is a future governance parameter change, not new code).

8. Decision Log#

Every place this specification made a call rather than citing a whitepaper number:

1. Decimals = 9.
2. Presale bucket = 20% (200,000,000 OPEN), confirmed by the protocol steward — funds two sequential sale phases (a $2,000,000-target presale at 1 OPEN = 1 USDC, then a public sale at 1 OPEN = 1.25 USDC for whatever remains unsold) rather than sizing a single capped raise.
3. All allocation percentages, vesting cliffs/durations.
4. Presale hard/soft cap, min/max contribution, no vesting on presale tokens (with tradeoff stated), 1% max slippage, stablecoin whitelist contents.
5. Staking minimums (flat + arbitrator-specific), unbonding period, slashing %, the four enumerated slashing triggers (two of which depend on future amendments elsewhere).
6. Unstake-request effective-stake timing = immediate reduction.
7. Governance: "OFIP" naming, 6-category taxonomy, deposit amount, quorum/threshold numbers, vote-lock duration, cast-time snapshot, quorum-met-as-frivolity-proxy.
8. Fee amounts, dust-handling rule.
9. The strict-fixed-supply resolution of the Ch.13/Ch.23 inconsistency.